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Introduction
Despite political gestures that aim at overcoming historical differences, many 
issues related to war, occupation, ethnic conflict, population transfer, and violence 
from the past remain unresolved. They are especially challenging in multi-ethnic 
societies and regions with a long history of border changes.1 a high degree of cul-
tural heterogeneity defines the former Italo-Yugoslav borderland and the city of 
Trieste/Trst in particular. This is an area which has experienced regular re-drawings 
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of borders and reconfiguration of the state order almost to the present day.2 The 
complex heritage of the twentieth century remains at the center of public debate. 
Local historical diatribes often reach beyond the regional framework and feed into 
national narratives and international tensions. Memories of war stir local emotions 
and spread in concentric circles through Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia. The politiciza-
tion of public memory as an aspect of the re-evaluation of the past is an important 
part of the local public sphere.3
In the last decades, scholars have shown how discourses of fractured memories 
have been formed and how divided historical narratives run alongside and intersect 
with ethnic and ideological divisions. On the basis of interviews with the local popu-
lation or official memory practices, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists have 
analysed memories of ethnic and ideological violence. They have demonstrated how 
different narratives stress certain events while forgetting other stories of violence.4 
even the physical landscape has been affected by clashing memorials, so that it has 
become a contemporary site of contestation.5 as Katia Pizzi puts it, “Trieste was, and 
still is, finding it difficult to shake off the heritage of its already heavily monumental-
ized past.”6 But even if some attention has been given to the ways memories and 
(certain) memorials are reconfigured and reinterpreted over time, the interplay 
between memory (in its various forms) and the production of geographical space has 
received relatively little attention. The most discussed cases are the Risiera di San 
Sabba camp in Trieste and the “foiba” in Basovizza/Bazovica. Both speak clearly 
about contrasting memories and the exclusion of victims’ self-representations.7 
However, despite these studies, there has been no systematic research into the local 
mnemonic landscape. This is surprising if we consider the centrality of the territorial 
dimension and the role played by history in the formation of local collective memo-
ries. Spatial characteristics and artefacts from the past are the elements that embody 
the emotions of a community, encoded in material form, narrations, and practices. 
Based on an analysis of monuments and memorials to Yugoslav partisans in Trieste, 
this study focuses on the ideological imprint shaping the local cultural landscape in 
order to contribute to a more complex understanding of memory engagement in 
european borderlands. It demonstrates how forms of dissidence and of “multidirec-
tional” memory, as signs of a divided present, bring tensions to the fore.8
The first part of this article will briefly introduce the history of the city and set the 
discourses of divided memories in the northern adriatic context. In the next part I 
will present the process of local memory engagement through the construction of 
memorials. Much scholarly work focuses on the officially sanctioned memory land-
scape, taking for granted that monuments are installed by national governments in a 
unilateral top–down direction. Studies of the most impressive Soviet memorials in 
Berlin, Vienna, or in the former Soviet Union and eastern europe tend to promote 
this vision.9 The recent popularization of forgotten Yugoslav spomeniks confirms this 
assumption. Writing about the exhibition of work by the photographer Jan 
Kempenaers in London in 2013, dedicated to his pictures of Cold War Yugoslav 
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monuments—“Spomeniks”—Joshua Surtees in the Guardian defined them as 
“bizarre architectural ‘medals in the countryside’ planted by Tito.”10 In contrast, this 
essay re-directs attention to lesser-known memorials, uncovering grassroots initia-
tives rather than exploring state-sponsored heritage projects. However, this memory-
activism opens up new questions: given that the existing literature has presented 
memory-entrepreneurs mainly as political actors who invoke memories for political 
gain, for whom “no publicity is bad publicity,”11 the case of Trieste calls for more 
detailed research into the management of the past and into civic memory production 
that goes beyond official initiatives.
In an attempt to find a conceptual framework that can lead to a more nuanced 
understanding of the way monuments operate within historical discourse, I have 
drawn primarily on John Bodnar’s work on public memory and commemoration. 
Like Bodnar I use the notion of vernacular memory.12 On the basis of archival mate-
rial and interviews with the local population, I argue that vernacular memory cultures 
have produced several examples of bottom–up memory signs. However, the aim of 
this article is twofold: On the one hand, I will show how collective remembrance is 
an outcome of the agency of individuals or groups who come together, “not at the 
behest of the state or any of its subsidiary organizations, but because they have to 
speak out.”13 On the other, I am interested how different state-sponsored narratives 
are negotiated and reproduced by local communities in a border context. My primary 
inquiry is what relationship exists between the attitude of local people toward the 
rearrangement of political borders, the contestation of collective memories, and the 
creation of a subaltern mnemonic landscape. In recent years, scholars have shown 
the state’s role in creating and controlling border communities, but also have pointed 
out that borders are places where memories intertwine, overlap, and clash, producing 
what Tatiana Zhurzhenko calls “communities of memory.”14 Here, the Italo-Yugoslav 
borderland is used as a heuristic tool that can go beyond local dimensions to uncover 
more general aspects of memory politics. Finally, this essay aims at entering the 
debate about the supposed specificity of Central and eastern european processes of 
remembering.15 It argues that even if the rise in the political use of history is particu-
larly evident in post-socialist countries, it cannot be seen as an explicitly eastern 
european phenomenon, since it has much in common with other political uses of the 
past in europe and worldwide.16
Historical Background
In Habsburg times an important center of economic and cultural exchange, 
Trieste (known as Trst by Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians; Triest by germans 
and Hungarians; and Terst by Czechs and Slovaks) today is in a peripheral position 
not only in geographical terms but also at the political, social, and economic mar-
gins of Italy. Like several other post-imperial historical centers, it is a town with a 
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“relatively short but occasionally glorious past, a more modest present, and an 
uncertain future.”17 However, the town has often been at the center of contrasting 
local, national, and international narratives and has been noted for its frequently 
changing political and symbolic borders. In both scholarly and popular imagina-
tions, this area has typically been viewed as either a transitional zone, an area of 
cultural cross-fertilization, or as a site of violent “civilizational” shifts. especially 
in the twentieth century, it often functioned as a powerful symbolic boundary. It is 
a place where several key axes of european symbolic geography met: the West and 
the east; the german, Latin, and Slav Worlds; europe and the Balkans; and fascism, 
democracy, and communism.18
after World War I and the fall of austria-Hungary, Trieste became part of the 
Kingdom of Italy and the new eastern borderland, renamed Venezia giulia, played a 
key role in Italy’s post-war national symbolism. Symbolic language has been evident 
at several levels from toponomastics to commemorations, architecture, and in the 
shaping of the cultural landscape in general. even if monumentalization started soon 
after the end of the great War (parchi della rimembranza, zone sacre), this process 
gained particular importance in the Fascist era. In the provinces annexed after World 
War I (Trieste and Venezia giulia, but also South Tyrol), newly erected monuments, 
buildings, and spatial planning in general had an important ideological and national 
function, while commemorative practices and related rituals helped to shape the 
nation and integrate individuals into the national body.19
Soon after Mussolini took power, anti-fascists formed illegal groups and orga-
nized subversive and propagandistic actions. Thus, after the attack on Yugoslavia in 
1941, the resistance movement in the region could rely on an already established 
“culture of anti-fascism” among part of the population. after the collapse of the 
regime in summer 1943, the region was occupied by Nazi troops and became part of 
the Third Reich, with the name Operationszone adriatisches Küstenland, until the 
end of the war. Following the german defeat, the area became contested again. “Few 
areas in europe have been so consistently disputed, both on the battlefield and at the 
conference table, and it is difficult to find an example wherein boundary changes 
have been more frequent or where the problem of paying due regard to the interests 
and wishes of the people who constitute the majority of its inhabitants has presented 
more difficulty,” argued the geographer arthur Moodie at a meeting of the Royal 
geographical Society in London in February 1943.20
The victory of the allies in 1945 opened the possibility of revising the former Italo-
Yugoslav border. Italy, on one hand, tried to maintain the pre-1941 borders, and 
Yugoslavia, on the other, tried to annex as much of the area as possible. While the 
Italian claims referred to earlier, pre-war arrangements, the Yugoslav demands were 
advanced on the basis of the victories of (and the losses sustained by) the Yugoslav 
partisan army, which had a strong presence in this area. However, it had already 
become clear during the war that the so-called Trieste question was much more com-
plex, transcending Italian–Yugoslav bilateral relations. “Proper” war and the Cold 
War overlapped in this region and it is impossible to divide the two periods clearly. 
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The northern Adriatic after World War II with memorial sites  
analyzed in the article
The area soon turned into a symbolic stage for european bipolarity. By June 1945, 
under the pressure of the western allies, the Yugoslav army had already left Trieste 
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and moved 20 km to the east, towards Koper (Capodistria in Italian). They were 
replaced by american and British forces. The failure of the boundary commission to 
determine a “scientifically-based ethnic border between Italians and Slavs” led to the 
constitution of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT, 1947–1954).21 With the Treaty of 
Paris coming into effect on 15 September 1947, the FTT was divided in two zones: 
Zone a (including the city of Trieste with a narrow coastal strip to the north-west) was 
administered by British and american armies, while Zone B (the north-western part 
of the Istrian peninsula, an area today shared by Slovenia and Croatia) was adminis-
tered by Yugoslav military forces with a seat in Koper. This territorial division repre-
sented not only the border between Italy and Yugoslavia but also the physical (and 
mental) border between east and West and between communism and capitalism. It 
defined the “southern end” of the Iron Curtain, which in the aftermath of the war—to 
cite Churchill’s historic speech of March 1946—divided europe from “Stettin in the 
Baltic to Trieste in the adriatic.” In fact, the border between Italy and Yugoslavia was 
only “Iron” during the first decade after the end of the war. Tito’s conflict with Stalin, 
which culminated in the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948, led to 
the border between Italy and Yugoslavia becoming more of a “Venetian blind” than an 
insurmountable division between east and West. In particular, living conditions along 
the border gradually improved from 1954 onwards with the repartition of the Free 
Territory of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia. The situation was finally settled in 
1975, after the conference on security and co-operation held in Helsinki, with the 
signing of the Osimo Treaty between the two neighbouring countries.22 With the inde-
pendence of Slovenia and Croatia and the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, the 
border between Italy and Yugoslavia changed into an Italo-Slovene borderline and the 
politics of memory created new pasts and new myths.
Building Memory
Two decades of political exclusion, social conflict, ethnic marginalization, and 
war (especially World War II but also earlier conflicts in ethiopia and Spain) heav-
ily affected the population of the northern adriatic region. Four years of war and 
the battle for Trieste in the last days of april and at the beginning of May 1945 
cost hundreds of lives. The end of the conflict brought with it a wave of com-
memorative activities to give voice to histories of suffering and silenced memo-
ries. Mass funerals of local partisan soldiers were organized after the end of armed 
hostilities. Both in Trieste and in the villages around it, local communities buried 
their fallen. Usually, they organised mass services and guards of honour that took 
part in processions to the cemeteries, where tombstones or simple memorial 
plaques were erected. In most cases, they displayed the names of the fallen, but 
sometimes headstones showed distinctive political and ideological symbols, for 
instance, a red star or a hammer and sickle.23
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Meanwhile new commemorative processes developed and the first monuments to 
fallen partisans were constructed, as symbols of the “concretisation of history.”24 a 
plaque commemorating three partisans was built by local residents on the greta hill 
(Komenščina na Trsteniku, today known as via Bruni, in the suburb of Trieste) and 
was unveiled on 30 May 1945.25 Several others followed in the summer months of 
1945. In Rodik, a village on the Karst plateau thirty kilometers north-east of Trieste, 
a zone where the wartime repression of the local population had been particularly 
cruel, a monument was unveiled in July of the same year. a year before, on 21 July 
1944, Wehrmacht soldiers of the 118th Jäger Division and other collaborationist 
units had killed seven boys and girls from the village, using extreme violence. On the 
first anniversary, “men from the village went to Bazovica and brought back the mate-
rial for the monument on a carriage. Our monument was the first to be constructed 
after the war.”26 a simple monument, around three meters high, was erected from 
local rocks, and a plaque with the names and dates of birth of the victims was placed 
on the upper part of the memorial stone. The names of the fallen partisans from the 
village followed on the lower part. a red star was placed on the top of the monument, 
as was the case with the great majority of memorials at that time, but the order of 
precedence of the names inscribed on the plaque shows that rather than celebrating a 
glorious revolutionary battle the memorial expressed pain and mourning for “an 
entire generation lost by the village community.”27 even if memories of atrocities, 
burned houses, and deportations have been largely “frozen”—to use a term elabo-
rated by Tony Judt—by giving precedence to more heroic examples of partisan strug-
gle, and by spreading a positive message of post-war reconstruction, this case of 
extreme violence remained at the center of local collective memory.28 In the follow-
ing years, memories of atrocities were transmitted orally within families rather than 
through schools or in other official rituals; as argued by Zerubavel, the family is an 
important social environment that provides the context of mnemonic socialization.29 
Remembrance was ritualized by local communities rather than by official memorial-
ization and the monument in the main square embodied the cultural memory of the 
community.
Intense memory activity was not uncommon in many smaller centres, such as in 
Longera/Lonjer, a village in the suburbs of Trieste. Here on 24 March 1946, on the 
first anniversary of the attack of the police on the local “bunker” where partisans 
where hiding and where four of them perished, a similar monument was unveiled.30 
In Dolina a simple, around two-meter-high memorial with the names of the local 
partisans and other victims was dedicated on 28 July, in Sgonico/Zgonik and 
Trebiciano/Trebče, similar monuments but made of stones were inaugurated sol-
emnly on 29 September 1946, while in Contovello/Kontovel, Bagnoli/Boljunec, and 
in the district of San giovanni/Sv. Ivan, plaques and same kind of memorials were 
unveiled on Sunday, 2 November 1947, after all Saints day, when the population 
gathers at cemeteries.31 If the initiatives and the coordination of the celebrations were 
in the hands of former partisans and their supporters, a closer look shows that the 
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majority of the memorials were erected mainly by those whom Bodnar calls “ordi-
nary people.”32 The discourses at the celebrations were highly political and mirrored 
the struggle for territorial appropriation of the region. But the population participated 
also to express their personal sentiments.33 Thus, political content intertwined with 
voices of grief for fallen comrades and sorrow over the loss of loved ones.
Unlike state-sponsored monumental memorials, as was the case with Soviet mon-
uments erected in Berlin or Vienna immediately after the war, these partisan memori-
als were realised on the initiative of village communities and groups of combatants 
who had returned home after the war. Usually, veterans nominated a committee and 
appointed a president, who assumed the function of coordinator and distributed tasks 
among the members. But the roles varied and very often they were not strictly and 
formally defined. The projects were mainly self-directed and were carried out on a 
voluntary basis.34 Moreover, the monuments were financed by local communities: 
funds were raised by collecting money door to door and the sum was usually 
employed for the purchase of building materials. Other works (carving, etc.) were 
carried out by volunteers and artisans, who were themselves often former partisans 
or their sympathizers. Because of limited financial resources, these memorials usu-
ally consist of large slabs of stone (even if sometimes local marble could be found), 
on which, in most cases, stands a red star (the symbol worn by the Yugoslav partisan 
army, but also by the Italian Communist partisans) and an inscription commemorat-
ing the fallen combatants (i.e., “Honour to the fallen Partisans,” etc.). In many cases, 
the names of the fallen partisans and murdered hostages were engraved on the 
monuments.35
They were usually constructed in the middle of village squares or on the main 
routes leading into the village. Memory activists wanted them to be placed on the 
nodes of major axes to confirm the general importance of their subject and maximize 
their visibility.36 In the village of Dolina, where a monument was constructed at the 
end of July 1946 and placed in proximity to the monument commemorating a Slovene 
nationalist gathering from the nineteenth century, the positioning also drew symbolic 
power from the meaning of the already existing memorial.
Because of the ethnic composition of the population of the surroundings of Trieste, 
predominantly inhabited by Slovenes, the inscriptions on the monuments are usually 
in the Slovene language.37 In the case of Italian partisans, the inscriptions were also 
in Italian. In this way, the monuments assumed a transnational character, which was 
also reflected in official commemorations. even in Slovene-speaking areas out of 
Trieste, most of the speeches were given in Slovene and Italian—something that was 
more a reflection of the political situation than an act arising from a practical need for 
bilingual ceremonies. Most of the ceremonies had a standard scenario: memorials 
were covered with wreaths brought by the families of the fallen and/or by the local 
veterans’ organisation, nearby houses were adorned with flags (Slovene, Yugoslav, 
Soviet, and Italian—with the red star in the middle, but not infrequently also 
american and British flags), local choirs sang partisan songs in Slovene and Italian, 
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The memorial in Sgonico/Zgonik built in 1946
and after the speeches, again in both languages, a moment of silence followed, and 
other songs concluded the ceremony.
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Such practices of remembrance transcend the traditional spatial and conceptual 
schemes provided for commemorative purposes, such as the local cemetery, and 
instead become part of the public sphere and of general, collective mourning. The 
case was similar to many parts of Yugoslavia, where “there was barely a village . . . 
that did not have its local war memorial.”38 Similar practices also developed in what 
was becoming the Free Territory of Trieste. even if this was a long-term process, 
from the first post-war months onwards, the claim that not a single village lacked 
plaques in memory of the fallen partisans also become true for the Zone a of the 
FTT. This is confirmed by Patrizia Dogliani, who analysed the fascist and anti-fascist 
heritage in Italy, affirming that the Friuli–Venezia giulia region (created in 1963, 
with Trieste as its capital), along with emilia-Romagna, has the highest number of 
memorials to anti-fascist resistance in Italy.39
A City without Resistance?
However, it would be misleading not to consider the difference between the sub-
urbs and the surrounding villages on one side, and the city centre, the central piazza, 
on the other. In Trieste, even many pro-Yugoslav manifestations were held largely in 
the Italian language. The nationalist and fascist narratives of superior civilization 
and practices of racial exclusion against the “Slavs” left behind long-term effects 
that persisted well beyond the break-up of the regime in summer 1943 and the offi-
cial end of the war in 1945.40 This challenges perceptions of two ethnically divided 
blocks and conventional views of the “Slavness of Triestine communism.”41 
Moreover, it reveals forms of shared supra-national narratives (based on anti-fascist 
solidarity) developed primarily during the war years.42 The Slavic-Italian anti-
Fascist Union (Unione Antifascista Italo-Slava in Italian and Slovansko-italijanska 
antifašistična unija in Slovene, UaIS/SIaU), the regional successor to the Partisan 
Liberation Front (Osvobodilna fronta) and the central umbrella organization for all 
local pro-Yugoslav left politics (until the split in 1948), just as in Yugoslavia, pro-
moted the ideal of brotherhood and unity. In the case of Trieste, however, “brother-
hood and unity” did not refer to the Yugoslav nations and nationalities, as was the 
case in Yugoslavia, but rather advocated brotherhood and unity between Italians and 
“Slavs” (Slovenes). However, the allied military government that ruled zone a from 
mid-June 1945 for the next nine years made sense of their mission by adding the 
familiar image of national and class character to the ideological contraposition 
between anti-communism and communism.43 although the complexity of choices 
went well beyond ethnic and political contrapositions, the allied military govern-
ment (aMg) officials portrayed it as a clear-cut division, with Trieste presented as 
predominantly Western, civilized, democratic, and Italian and its suburbs as eastern, 
Balkan, Slav, communist, and backward. Their mental geography designated ethno-
national spaces in the urban milieu, trying to confine the “Slav-communists” to the 
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suburbs and beyond the “city walls.” Thus, the funerals organized by the UaIS/
SIaU in the first post-war months through the centre of Trieste, portrayed as exclu-
sively “Italian” and therefore “off-limits for Slav-communists,” could be seen as 
“popular forms of transgression” of this “attempted ethno-national ghettoization of 
Trieste.”44
The unveiling of partisan monuments became controversial in that they repre-
sented support for Yugoslav territorial claims in the spirit of the propagandist post-
war slogan “our victims define our borders.”45 The Cominform division of the 
anti-fascist milieu in the Zone a of the FTT after 1948 additionally entangled the 
local commemorative options. at a local level, the Yugoslav withdrawal from the 
Cominform was painful, especially in Zone a of the FTT: this option divided entire 
communities, families, and former combatants. The division did not occur along 
national lines. Only a minority of Slovene Communists followed the Yugoslav anti-
Stalinist path. Most of them remained loyal to the Soviet line. If a joint celebration 
was in some cases still possible, the new context made the construction of monu-
ments, planning of ceremonies, and any anti-fascist commemoration in general very 
difficult and often impossible. Memorials were now owned by Stalin supporters, 
belonging to Italian and also Slovene communist factions that rejected Tito and 
Yugoslavia. On the other hand, they were also claimed by Tito’s supporters, who 
were a minority but were able to count on a solid and widespread organisational 
core and the support of neighbouring Yugoslavia. at the same time, the anti-fascist 
experience was also shared by anti-Communist Slovenes, who emphasised the pri-
macy of the pre-war, national rather than international, anti-fascist struggle. The 
latter was symbolised by the monument dedicated to four anti-fascists erected in 
Basovizza/Bazovica in September 1945, which affirmed the importance of remem-
bering the pre-war fascist discriminatory policy against ethnic minorities. even 
today it represents one of the most important sites of memory for the Slovene minor-
ity in Italy.46
But was this memory activism meant to support territorial claims over the region? 
In addition to performing the function of memorialising artefacts in the public sphere, 
the question arises of whether post-war memorials to fallen partisans also functioned 
as markers of ethnic and/or political/ideological borders and tools for territorial 
demarcation. after WWI, victorious Italy, as on its new northern border with austria 
(the Victory Monument in Bolzano/Bozen), erected a series of monuments on its new 
eastern border, for example, in Redipuglia/Sredipolje and Kobarid/Caporetto. These 
regions were ethnically extremely entangled. In accordance with the state politics of 
nationalization of its borderlands, these memorials were unveiled (also) with the aim 
of performing a national and ideological demarcation of the area.47 Similarly, the 
complexes built by the Soviets in Berlin and Vienna after WWII “were meant to 
glorify the wartime sacrifices and victories of the Soviet army but also to signal—by 
drawing on the notion of frontier camps—Russia’s claim to govern a large chunk of 
europe.”48
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The extremely entangled political situation and the struggle for territorial appropria-
tion were also reflected in memorials and commemorations. Despite the public discourse 
of unity and the aim of creating an anti-fascist national memory-image, it was rare for a 
public gathering to unite all anti-fascist elements. The contents of partisan ceremonies 
reflected the complex political reality and were an argument in the hands of the pro-
Yugoslav option. Therefore, these commemorations (regardless of nationality) were per-
ceived as legitimating the annexation of the area to Yugoslavia and, despite the high 
number of local victims, a central partisan monument in Trieste was never constructed. 
This creates the impression, opposed to the Viennese space of memory described by 
Heidemarie Uhl as a “city in resistance,” of Trieste being a “city without resistance.”49
Were partisan memorials in the Italo-Yugoslav borderland also erected with the 
aim of establishing a national and ideological demarcation of the disputed territory? 
Could it be that they were even part of the celebratory system of arches, memorials 
and flags which welcomed the Boundary Commission, the body that visited the 
region in March and april 1946 and was, in the eyes of the locals, the arbitrator that 
would adjudicate the territorial belonging of the area? even if political and cultural 
leaders promoted the vision of the fallen as fighters for annexation to Yugoslavia, this 
rhetoric was short-lived. If in the first weeks after the war, these local practices of 
remembrance could be balanced by an optimistic rhetoric of a better future in social-
ist Yugoslavia, after the allied military government took control of the region and the 
signing of the Paris treaty in February 1947 established the FTT, any territorial 
change was highly improbable. a closer look at the sources shows that local commit-
tees did not explicitly erect monuments for this purpose and traditional forms of 
remembrance of the dead dominated. The intertwining of revolution and tradition is 
confirmed by the visual language of the monuments, displaying on the same memo-
rial a traditional cross together with a more revolutionary red star. The great majority 
of the memorials were constructed to memorialize local partisan fighters and victims 
of Nazi and Fascist terror (deported to concentration camps or executed) rather than 
being markers of territorial annexation. even if murdered hostages and prisoners 
were often given secondary importance in comparison with “proper” partisans who 
had fallen in battle, their names were inscribed on the monuments and their sacrifice 
was used as a proof of the suffering of the local population. Therefore, if from the 
very beginning monuments served to evoke the victorious partisan war, what pre-
vailed and what was central both in the inscriptions of the monuments and in the 
celebrations were loss and mourning.
Managing Memory
In 1954, the Free Territory of Trieste was divided between Italy, which obtained 
Zone a from the British and american army, and Yugoslavia, which kept Zone B. 
The border between the two countries was fixed de facto. at that time, in the former 
Zone a, tensions between the supporters of Tito and Stalin gradually calmed down, 
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especially when, after Stalin’s death, the international political scene witnessed a 
rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s. The new 
relationship between Moscow and Belgrade had a decisive impact on the local 
political climate. even if “memory apartheid” persisted in several forms in Trieste, 
the reconciliation of the two main leftist political tendencies favoured a new wave 
of monument building. However, it was only after the parliament passed a new law 
on regional autonomy, permitting local administrations to pass planning acts, that 
new memorials could be constructed.50 Thus, the late 1960s and especially the 1970s 
saw a new phase in the construction of monuments: Sgonico/Zgonik in 1969, 
aurisina/Nabrežina in 1970, Prosecco/Prosek and Prebenico/Prebeng in 1972, 
gabrovizza/gabrovec in 1973, Caresana/Mačkolje in 1974, and Dolina and S. 
Croce/Križ in 1975 are only some examples of the new “statuomania.”51
Local volunteers building the memorial in Prebenico/Prebeneg in 1971
But modern times required more formal approaches than in the past: the new 
boards were often formally registered at the local court, spaces were officially pur-
chased, and memory spaces were designed by professional architects. Furthermore, 
after a gradual generational transmission of memory (even if many veterans were 
still living), the aesthetics of the monuments changed. Nonetheless, even if Mannheim 
warns us about the “fundamental distinction between appropriated memories and 
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personally acquired memories,” these examples reveal more mnemonic persistence 
than change.52 almost thirty years after the end of the war, the organizational models 
of commemorations (the establishment of a committee, etc.) remained unchanged 
and their implementation, in the form of anniversary celebrations, with speeches, 
recitals, and songs, remained largely the same. Memorials were still the result of 
bottom–up initiatives but became more imposing. The more the number of survivors 
of war diminished, the more the shape and dimensions of monuments increased. The 
new monuments were now in fact small memorial parks. equipped with flowerbeds, 
artificial lighting, and poles for brandishing flags or banners, they bore inscriptions 
which were usually bilingual Slovenian-Italian. even if most of the work was still 
carried out by local artisans after their working hours, funding solely on the basis of 
donations became extremely difficult.53
Because of the increasing costs of construction, an active role was played by local 
municipalities (with the exception of Trieste, they were mostly ruled by left-wing 
political majorities and with a strong presence of Slovenes throughout the Cold War 
period). Thus, local political leaders (such as mayors, but also regional and local 
deputies, cultural leaders, etc.) entered the celebratory mechanism and often used 
memory politics to strengthen their social power and promote their political careers. 
Since the boards were not able to collect the required sums of money, new monu-
ments were often co-funded also by several organizations, like the partisan Veterans 
organization of Slovenia (Zveza združenj borcev NOV Slovenije, founded in 1948), 
the Slovenian minority organisations in Italy (like the Slovene cultural and economic 
union, SKgZ), and the communal authorities.54 In the case of the memorial park in 
S. Croce/Križ, which was set up in 1975, the board asked for help from the Slovene 
Veterans organisation, which financed a huge bronze star. The designers of the plan 
intended the star to show the “sufferings of our people and their struggle against 
national and social repression before and during the war, by putting special emphasis 
on the National Liberation Struggle.”55 The star, whose creator was the Slovene 
sculptor Stojan Batič, was placed at the centre of a long rectangular wall built by the 
village community, where the names of the fallen and the victims were inscribed.
The veterans organizations, be they Italian (especially the associazione Nazionale 
Partigiani d’Italia [aNPI], linked to the Italian Communist Party) or from Slovenia 
and other parts of Yugoslavia, usually participated in the commemorations by pro-
viding speakers. They were expected to convey the double meaning of the local 
anti-fascist struggle: both national and social. The speakers were sometimes a 
source of friction between local committees and central offices, whether in Trieste 
(or Rome) and in Ljubljana (or Belgrade). The main accusation was usually based 
on a “lack of understanding of the local reality” and the “particular” audience of the 
border.56 a speaker from central Slovenia, who might open old sores among sup-
porters of the Cominform and the Titoists, was undesirable. The new boards of 
memory activists united in balancing between several political options, and aimed 
at overcoming the divisions of the past. at the same time, a Slovene speaker was 
expected to have an ethnic sensibility and include “the Italian democratic people” in 
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order not to be labelled as nationalist. Usually this was linked to demands for a more 
“just world,” which Slovenes shared with the “Italian proletariat.” a brochure pub-
lished by the board for the unveiling of the monument in aurisina/Nabrežina in 
1970 stated that “the contribution of our Slovenian working man has always been 
substantial and important from this aspect. especially because the Slovenes have 
always acted in solidarity with the Italian workers and without a doubt, . . . the con-
sciousness on the need for solid, reliable equality with everyone, especially the 
Italian working people, has been deeply rooted and felt by these Slovenes, espe-
cially if the struggle for general labour and special national rights is to bring the 
desired results.”57 On the other hand, an Italian speaker was expected to emphasise 
the significant contribution of the Slovenes in the struggle against Nazism and 
Fascism. Someone who would stress the importance of the Italian Resistenza with-
out highlighting the “suffering of Slovenes and Croats” during the fascist period—
and the primary role of the Slovene partisan movement—would be just as inadequate. 
Italian speakers were expected to acknowledge that fascist Italy led a policy of 
cultural genocide against the Slovenes and Croats.58
after several years of internal ideological conflict, many speakers emphasised 
the unity and “cooperation of all village people of various political opinions” in set-
ting up new memorials.59 They wanted to re-establish the tradition of joint com-
memorations that characterised the first post-war period. at the unveiling of the 
monument in Prosecco/Prosek, a village in the municipality of Trieste, in 1972, the 
speakers were the chairman of the board (Josip Ferfolja), the representatives of 
veterans associations and organizations of deportees, the Slovene communist Marija 
Bernetič, former deputy at the Italian parliament, her colleague albin Škerk, the 
representative of the socialist party and first Slovene in the Trieste city council after 
WWII (Dušan Hreščak), the representative of the local Slovene non-communist, 
“national” party (Slovenska skupnost) Drago Štoka, the regional representative of 
the Italian Veterans association (aNPI) Paolo Sema, and some other locals. In short, 
all political components of what was considered progressive and anti-fascist society 
were represented. Based on the example of large popular fronts during the war, the 
organizers aimed to express a message of unity and cooperation to gain political 
credit and national rights. The pamphlet issued by the board ascribed a clear national 
meaning to the partisan monuments in the region, since they proved the “presence 
of the Slovene national community in Italy. There are only few such external visible 
signs that would speak clearly about our presence in the Trieste region.”60 even 
more, the local poet and writer Miroslav Košuta, author of the foreword to the book-
let issued together with the construction of the memorial in Križ, saw the new mon-
uments as “stations on the Via Crucis of our people, proofs of its Slovene and 
anti-fascist origins, of its liberty redeemed with blood.”61 Thus, together with their 
commemorative function, these monuments had a clear political function; not only 
did they represent political revenge against conservative parties and those state 
authorities in Italy who were trying to downplay the anti-fascist myth in the country, 
but also signs of counter-memory against regional and local official narratives 
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which, in the eyes of local memory activists, were trying to “hide” the presence of 
the Slovene minority. They considered the minority policy largely inadequate and 
understood the partisan memorials, and especially their inscriptions in the Slovene 
language, as one of the few visible testimonials to the physical presence of Slovenes 
on the territory. as Madeleine Hurd points out, “language remains an extremely 
potent marker of ethnicity” and since rights of minorities in european borderlands 
are often suspended between possibility and marginalisation, the representation of 
minority languages as part of the production of space is always a question of the 
power of its speakers.62 Rarely did ordinary citizens express their disagreement in 
violent terms but they often channelled it through local monuments as vernacular 
symbols with which they identified. In this sense, the partisan memorials and related 
commemorations not only celebrated past events but also served as significant polit-
ical tools in the present.
In many cases, bureaucratic complications had to be surmounted; these complica-
tions however, were not merely a result of sluggish bureaucracy, but arose from the 
opposition of local authorities to such memorials.63 In the case of right-wing admin-
istrations, as was the case of Trieste throughout the Cold War (except for a center-left 
government in the middle of the 1960s), partisan memorials provoked harsh political 
disputes and long-lasting public debates. One of the most significant cases is the 
monument for the fallen from Servola/Škedenj, S. anna/Sv. ana, and Coloncovez/
Kolonkovec. During the war, these were peripheral parts of Trieste but in the next 
decades they became an integral part of the urban space. In these districts, from the 
early post-war years—but especially after 1971, when a committee was estab-
lished—local memory activists tried in vain to set up a memorial. The city adminis-
tration opposed it on the ground that the same area already had a monument: the 
concentration camp of “Risiera di San Sabba,” declared a monument of national 
interest in 1965. However, many believed that the reason for the objection had little 
to do with the Risiera camp. In fact, a monument to local partisans in the city centre 
would demolish the myth of the local post-war political, economic, and religious 
elites, which was constructed on the image of Trieste being a bulwark against “Slav-
communism.” For decades, local political leaders legitimised their social power 
through the representation of the past as the patriotic struggle of “Italian Western 
civilization” against “eastern, Slavic/Yugoslav barbaric communism.”
Negotiations between the activists and the political elite produced no effect in the 
short term.64 Because of the negative responses of the authorities, the committee resolved 
to make a self-appropriation of the public sphere and promote their own memory space. 
Overnight, local memory activists placed a memorial stone, a cube, on which a bilingual 
inscription stated “glory to the Fallen.” In its proximity, on 1 November (all Saints) and 
25 april (Liberation Day in Italy), these memory activists organized celebrations with 
laying of flowers and lighting of candles. Pupils of the local Slovene primary school 
declaimed songs and performed short recitals, while other participants included families 
of the fallen, members of the Committee, and other citizens, usually left-wing. These 
semi-official ceremonies, modest at the beginning but gradually more organised, 
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constantly challenged the official silence of the authorities with respect to local victims, 
as well as the essence of the institutionalized interpretation of the recent history of 
Trieste. Because of growing public visibility and the changing political climate, in 2001, 
during the second mandate of the center-left mayor Riccardo Illy, the municipality offi-
cially recognized this site of memory, allowing the area to be improved and the tempo-
rary memorial stone to be replaced by a monument.65
Conclusion
even if some scholars affirm that the mutating political picture in the 1990s pro-
duced several attempts “to leave history behind,” the end of the Cold War, on the 
contrary, brought history to the fore.66 Memories not only melted after being frozen, 
but the new geopolitical setting enabled the rise of many competitive claims to 
emphasize their past. The growing literature on memory and identity in Central and 
eastern europe tends to present the role of history, politics of memory, and issues of 
collective identity as especially pronounced in post-1989 Central and eastern 
europe. However, the reinterpretation of the past, assigning new meanings to com-
munism, collaborationism, resistance, and patriotism, is not limited to transition 
countries from the former Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia but is a widespread phenom-
enon in many european countries.67 In Italy, the transformation of the Communist 
Party, the biggest “western” communist party, the rise of new political forces such 
as the Lega nord and Forza Italia, and the presence of post-fascists in the govern-
ment led to a weakening of the anti-fascist myth and to a revision of the Resistance 
paradigm.68 In this new context, what was the role played by the Italo-Yugoslav 
border? It is no coincidence that the most significant attempt to unite Italy’s “frac-
tured memory” took place in Trieste.69 It was here that Luciano Violante, head of the 
new post-communist left, met the post-fascist leader gianfranco Fini in March 1998, 
to overcome the national traumas stemming from past political divisions. In this 
attempt to create a shared national memory they found a new common enemy in 
“failed” Yugoslav communism and its bearers, the Yugoslav partisans. Since then the 
partisans have been increasingly presented as a tool in the hands of “Slavic annexa-
tionism,” as President giorgio Napolitano stated in 2007, causing an international 
controversy between Rome and Zagreb.70 The “foibe” and the “exodus” from Istria 
(presented as ethnic cleansing of the Yugoslavs against Italians) and the concentra-
tion camp of the Risiera di San Sabba in Trieste have been elevated to the principal 
sites of memory through which individual memories have been channeled into col-
lective and political narratives of World War II. Thus, the memorialization of 
Yugoslav partisans amounts to near-subversive acts and their monuments have 
become signs of subaltern (or semi-official) counter-memory, which have so far 
remained outside the national corpus of the local lieux de mémoire.
In conclusion, the partisan memorials in Trieste and its region, which in the long term 
produced multiple memories and historical myths, confirm the impact of institutionalized 
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commemorative practices on individual memory,71 but show us also that memory build-
ing is not a unilateral process. Several grassroots memory initiatives show us that they are 
not merely the outcome of national narratives and ideological impositions. Instead, offi-
cial narratives have to negotiate with vernacular forms of memory engagement in the 
production of local mnemonic landscape. Often commemorations were perceived as 
public demonstrations but these spaces were not intended, in its initial stage at least, 
solely for political purposes, but to mourn the dead. What I argue is that “ordinary peo-
ple” created their own memory space to gain official acknowledgement of their primary 
role in “fighting Nazi-fascism” and their suffering during the war. The persistence of 
these markers in the present confirms the incongruity of official and vernacular narratives 
and shows that local forms of memorialization bring their own specific set of challenges. 
In our case, local memory initiatives redirect the perspective from a horizontal analysis 
of european politics of the past, divided between east and West, and call also this to be 
integrated with a vertical study of memory-making.
Acknowledgments
This article is based on my research project “Border Monuments: Representations of Myths, Memories 
and Identities in the 20th Century North-eastern adriatic” supported by a Humboldt Foundation 
Fellowship at the Lehrstuhl für Südosteuropäische geschichte of the Institut für geschichtswissenschaften 
of the Humboldt University in Berlin and developed later on within my projects “Sites of Memory, Sites 
of Border: Memory and Identity in the Italo-Slovene Borderland in the Long Twentieth Century,” 
financed by the Slovenian Research agency, and “adriatic Perspectives. Memory and Identity on a 
Transnational european Periphery,” financed by a Marie Skłodowska Curie grant at the european 
University Institute. I would like to thank the colleagues of the summer semester 2011 of the Berliner 
Forschungscolloquim Südosteuropa, the participants to the conference From the Iron Curtain to the 
Schengen area held in Vienna in September 2011 and to the european Social Science History Conference 
held in Valencia in april 2016 for their useful suggestions and Sabine Rutar, Maura Hametz, Fernando 
Zamola, gaetano Dato, gorazd Bajc, Wolfgang Müller, Libora Oates-Indruchová, and the two anony-
mous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.
Notes
 1. O. Bartov and e. Weitz, Shatterzone of Empires. Coexistence and Violence in the German, 
Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).
 2. B. C. Novak, Trieste 1941–1954. La lotta politica, etnica e ideologica (Milano: Mursia, 1996); g. 
Sluga, The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border. Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in 
Twentieth-Century Europe (albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); R. Wörsdörfer, Krisenherd 
Adria 1915–1955. Konstruktion und Artikulation des Nationalen im italienisch-jugoslawischen Grenzraum 
(Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2004); M. Hametz, Making Trieste Italian 1918–1954 (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 2005); M. Cattaruzza, L’Italia e il confine orientale: 1866-2006 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); J. 
Pirjevec, Trst je naš! Boj Slovencev za morje 1848-1954 (Ljubljana: Nova revija, 2008).
 3. g. Crainz, Il dolore e l’esilio. L’Istria e le memorie divise d’Europa (Roma: Donzelli, 2005); M. 
Verginella, Il confine degli altri. La questione giuliana e la memoria slovena (Roma: Donzelli, 2008); V. 
D’alessio, “Dynamics of Identity and Remembrance in Trieste. Esodo, Foibe and the Complex Memory 
Klabjan / “Our Victims Define Our Borders” 19
of Italy’s Oriental Border,” in Confronting the Past: European Experiences, ed. V. Pavlaković, D. 
Pauković, and V. Raos (Zagreb: Political Science Research Centre, 2012), 285–316; M. Orlić, “Se la 
memoria (non) mi inganna . . . L’Italia e il ‘confine orientale’: riflessioni sulla storia e sul suo uso pub-
blico,” Acta histriae 23, no. 3 (2015): 475–86.
 4. P. Ballinger, History in Exile. Memory and Identity at the Borders of the Balkans (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2003); T. Smith, “Remembering and Forgetting a Contentious Past. Voices 
from the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier,” American Behavioral Scientist 51, no. 10 (2008): 1538–54; K. Širok, 
Kalejdoskop goriške preteklosti. Zgodbe o spominu in pozabi (Ljubljana: ZRC, 2012); a. Cattunar, Il 
confine delle memorie. Storia di vita e narrazioni pubbliche tra Italia e Jugoslavia (1922-1955) 
(Florence, Italy: Le Monnier, 2014). In another central european borderland, the Slovak historian 
Ľubomír Lipták writes that a dividing line runs through southern Slovakia, which during WWII was part 
of Hungary. In this territory, a Hungarian-speaking majority lived and the memorials dedicated to the 
Slovak partisan uprising are very few, which he terms as “parallel memory.” Ľ. Lipták, Storočie dlhšie 
ako sto rokov. O dejinách a historiografii (Bratislava: Kalligram, 1999), 335.
 5. Ballinger, “History in exile,” 21.
 6. K. Pizzi, “Trieste: a Dissident Port,” in The Cultural Identities of European Cities, ed. K. Pizzi 
and g. Weiss-Sussex (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), 27–42.
 7. P. Ballinger, “exhumed Histories: Trieste and the Politics of (exclusive) Victimhood,” Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans 6, no. 2 (2004): 145–59; g. Sluga, “The Risiera di San Sabba: Fascism, 
anti-fascism and Italian Nationalism,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 1 (1996): 401–12; C. gauchon, 
“Frontière Italo-Slovène et Province de Trieste: Lecture d’un paysage monumental et mémoriel,” 
Géographie et cultures 63 (2007): 43–66; M. Purvis and D. atkinson, “Performing Wartime Memories: 
Ceremony as Contest at the Risiera di San Sabba Death Camp, Trieste,” Social & Cultural Geography 
10, no. 3 (2009): 337–56.
 8. M. Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization 
(Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 2009).
 9. S. Michalski, Public Monuments: Art in Political Bondage 1870–1997 (London: Reaktion Books, 
1998), 125–31.
10. The Guardian, 18 June 2013, www.theguardian.com (accessed 27 March 2016).
11. S. allison, “Residual History: Memory and activism in Modern Poland,” Nationalities Papers 43, 
no. 6 (2015): 907; J. Bodnar, Remaking America. Public Memory, Commemoration and Patriotism in the 
Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 24.
12. Bodnar, Remaking America.
13. J. Winter and e. Sivan, “Setting the Framework,” in War and Remembrance in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. J. Winter and e. Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 6–39.
14. T. Zhurzhenko, “Borders and Memory,” in The Research Companion to Border Studies, ed. D. 
Wastl-Walter (aldershot, UK: ashgate, 2011), 63–84. On the nationalization of borders, see P. Judson, 
Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Ma: 
Harvard University Press, 2006).
15. M. Pakier and J. Wawrzyniak, “Memory and Change in eastern europe. How Special?,” in 
Memory and Change in Eastern Europe, ed. M. Pakier and J. Wawrzyniak (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2016), 1–20; a. Sierp, “Drawing Lessons from the Past: Mapping Change in Central and South-eastern 
europe,” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 30, no. 1 (2016): 3–9; a. Miller, “Historical 
Politics: eastern european Convolutions in the 21st Century,” in The Convolutions of Historical Politics, 
ed. a. Miller and M. Lipman (New York: Central european University Press), 1–20.
16. L. Oates-Indruchová and M. Blaive, “Border Communities: Microstudies on everyday Life, 
Politics and Memory in european Societies from 1945 to the Present,” Nationalities Papers 42, no. 2 
(2014): 195–98. In the same special issue see also the works of alena Pfoser, Tatiana Zhurzhenko, 
Machteld Venken, and Friederike Kind-Kovács.
17. This is the definition given by Rogers Brubaker in his historical analysis of the Transylvanian city 
of Cluj. R. Brubaker, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), xiii.
20 east european Politics and Societies and Cultures
18. See R. g. Rabel, Between East and West: Trieste, the United States, and the Cold War, 1941–1954 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988).
19. e. gentile, Il culto del littorio (Roma: Laterza, 1994).
20. a. e. F. Moodie, “The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary,” The Geographical Journal 101 (1943): 49.
21. Sluga, The Problem of Trieste, 140–41.
22. J. Pirjevec, B. Klabjan, and g. Bajc, Osimska meja. Jugoslovansko-italijanska pogajanja in 
razmejitev leta 1975 (Koper: annales, 2006).
23. arhiv Narodne in študijske knjižnice v Trstu. Odsek za zgodovino in narodopisje [archive of the 
National and Studies Library in Trieste/Trst. Section for History and etnography]. Fond Spomeniki NOB 
na Tržaškem in goriškem [Monuments of the National Liberation Movement in the area of Trieste/Trst 
and gorizia/gorica].
24. D. Rihtman-auguštin, “The Monument in the Main City Square. Constructing and erasing 
Memory in Contemporary Croatia,” in Balkan Identities. Nation and Memory, ed. M. Todorova, 180–96 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2004), 180.
25. a. Volpi Buzečan and V. Košuta Jagodic, eds., Rojan skozi čas. Po spominih, slikah in zgodovin-
skih virih (Rojan: Pripravljalni odbor za poimenovanje osnovne šole v Rojanu po bazoviških junakih, 
1978), 88.
26. Interview with M.S. on 19 July 2015.
27. Interview with D.g. on 19 July 2015.
28. T. Judt, “The Past Is another Country: Myth and Memory in Post-war europe,” in Memory 
and Power in Post-War Europe, ed. J.-W. Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
157–83.
29. e. Zerubavel, Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), 5.
30. Primorski dnevnik, 27 March 1946, 2.
31. Primorski dnevnik, 28 July 1946, 2; 29 September 1946, 2; 1 October 1946, 2; 4 November 1947, 1.
32. Bodnar, Remaking America, 16.
33. arhiv Narodne in študijske knjižnice, Fond NOB, Spomeniki. Interviews with a.S. on 4 July 2011 
and M.S. on 19 July 2015.
34. Interview with D.S. on 3 July 2011.
35. arhiv Narodne in študijske knjižnice, Fond NOB, Spomeniki.
36. Q. Stevens and K. a. Franck, Memorials as Spaces of Engagement: Design, Use and Meaning 
(New York: Routledge, 2016), 193.
37. g. Sluga, “Identità nazionale italiana e fascismo: alieni, allogeni e assimilazione sul confine nord-
orientale italiano,” in Nazionalismi di frontiera. Identità contrapposte sull’Adriatico nord-orientale, ed. 
M. Cattaruzza (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003), 171–202.
38. H. Karge, “Mediated Remembrance: Local Practices of Remembering the Second World War in 
Tito’s Yugoslavia,” European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoíre 16, no. 1 (2009): 51.
39. P. Dogliani, “I monumenti e le lapidi come fonti,” in Storia d’Italia nel secolo ventesimo. 
Strumenti e fonti, II, ed. C. Pavone (Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali, Dipartimento per i beni 
archivistici e librari, Direzione generale per gli archivi: Roma, 2006), 261–75.
40. V. D’alessio, “Dynamics of Identity and Remembrance in Trieste,” 290.
41. Sluga, The Problem of Trieste, 119.
42. M. Verginella, S. Volk, and K. Colja, Ljudje v vojni. Druga svetovna vojna v Trstu in na 
Primorskem (Koper: Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko, 1995).
43. Sluga, The Problem of Trieste, 132.
44. Ibid., 125.
45. “Kjer so naše žrtve—tam so naše meje [Our Victims define our Borders],” Nova pot, 23 
November 1945, 4.
46. g. Sluga, “Italian National Memory, National Identity and Fascism,” in Italian Fascism. History, 
Memory and Representation, ed. R. J. B. Bosworth and P. Dogliani (New York: Macmillan, 1999), 
Klabjan / “Our Victims Define Our Borders” 21
187–88; g. Dato, “Le celebrazioni per gli eroi di Bazovica (1945–1948): alcuni risultati di una ricerca in 
corso,” Acta Histriae 18, no. 3 (2010): 471–98.
47. P. Dogliani, “Redipuglia,” in I luoghi della memoria. Simboli e miti dell’Italia unita, ed. M. 
Isnenghi (Roma: Laterza, 1996), 375–89.
48. Michalski, “Public Monuments, 126.
49. H. Uhl, “Landscapes of Commemoration: Historical Memory and Monument Culture in austria 
(1945–2000),” in Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe. Legacies and Lessons from the 
Twentieth Century, ed. J. W. Borejsza and K. Ziemer (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 569–85.
50. P. Dogliani, “I Monumenti,” 267.
51. The term is borrowed by Michalski, Public Monuments, 13.
52. K. Mannheim, “The Problem of generations,” in Karl Mannheim: Essays, ed. P. Kecskemeti 
(London: Routledge, 1952), 276–322. On the persistence of memory and differences between genera-
tional cohorts, see M. Colangelo, Memorie diverse. Tre generazioni sul confine italo-sloveno di Trieste 
ricordano il XX secolo (Trieste: Lint, 2000). On the case of Nova gorica, on the Slovene side of the 
nowadays Italo-Slovene border, see S. Mihelj, “The Persistence of the Past: Memory, generational 
Cohorts and the ‘Iron Curtain,’” European Contemporary History 23, no. 3 (2014): 447–68.
53. Interview with D.S. on 3 July 2011 and R.K. on 27 May 2014.
54. arhiv Narodne in študijske knjižnice, Fond NOB, Spomeniki.
55. “Delo odbora za postavitev spomenika,” in Križani v boju za svobodo, ed. M. Košuta (Križ pri Trstu/S. 
Croce di Trieste: Odbor za postavitev spomenika padlim v boju proti nacifašizmu v Križu, 1975), 194–96.
56. Interview with D.K. on 12 april 2012.
57. D. Furlan, Občina Devin—Nabrežina v boju proti nacifašizmu / Il comune di Duino – Aurisina 
nella lotta contro il nazifascismo (Devin-Nabrežina: s.n., 1970): 8–10.
58. Interview with D.S. on 3 July 2011.
59. “Skrunitev spomenika padlim na Proseku 1992,” in 20 let spomenika padlim v N.O.B. na Proseku 
(Trst: VZPI-aNPI Prosek, 1992), 7.
60. “Skrunitev spomenika,” 7.
61. “Delo odbora za postavitev spomenika,” 9.
62. M. Hurd, “Introduction,” in Borderland Identities: Territory and Belonging in Central, North and 
East Europe, ed. M. Hurd (eslöv: gondolin, 2006), 11–27.
63. “Naš spomenik,” in Bazovica v boju [Basovizza/Bazovica in the struggle], ed. J. Koren (Bazovica: 
Odbor za postavitev spomenika padlim v NOB, 1973), 46–48.
64. N. Lukeš, “Il comitato per il monumento / Odbor za postavitev spomenika,” in Monumento ai 
caduti nella guerra di liberazione di Servola, S. Anna e Coloncovez / Spomenik padlim v NOB iz Škednja, 
Sv. Ane in Kolonkovca, ed. S. Volk (Trieste/Trst: Comune/Občina, 2001), 29–34.
65. N. Lukeš, “Il Comitato/Odbor,” 29.
66. I. Favretto, “Italy, eU enlargement and the ‘Reinvention’ of europe between Historical Memories 
and Present Representations,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online 6, no. 2 (2004): 169.
67. T. Judt, “The Past Is another Country,” 179–83.
68. a. Mammone, “a Daily Revision of the Past: Fascism, anti-fascism, and Memory in Contemporary 
Italy,” Modern Italy 11, no. 2 (2006): 217.
69. J. Foot, Fratture d’Italia (Milano: Rizzoli, 2009).
70. g. Franzinetti, “Le riscoperte delle ‘foibe,’” in Foibe: Una storia d’Italia, ed. J. Pirjevec (Torino: 
einaudi, 2009), 319–32.
71. Smith, “Remembering and Forgetting a Contentious Past,” 1552.
Borut Klabjan is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the european University Institute and an associ-
ate professor of History at the University of Primorska. He works on political and cultural history of 
Central and South-eastern europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries, with special emphasis on the Northern 
adriatic area, in Italian-Slovene/Yugoslav relations and in the Bohemian lands/Czechoslovakia. 
